4 results
5 - Stigmatization, Neoliberalism, and Resilience
- Edited by Peter A. Hall, Harvard University, Massachusetts, Michèle Lamont, Harvard University, Massachusetts
-
- Book:
- Social Resilience in the Neoliberal Era
- Published online:
- 05 May 2013
- Print publication:
- 22 April 2013, pp 158-182
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
This chapter applies the theories and tools of contemporary psychology to explore the relationship between neoliberalism understood as a set of values and socioeconomic conditions and various aspects of intergroup relations. My focus is on the sources and effects of prejudice or stigmatization and on the factors that confer resilience in the face of discrimination. There are significant puzzles here. Important contemporary social debates about immigration, racial equality, and aboriginal rights center on intergroup relations and such debates are now conditioned by neoliberal ideas (see Chapters 2 and 3). Does the prevalence of neoliberal beliefs increase the incidence of prejudice, as some suspect, or render it less likely by bringing meritocratic values to the fore (Becker 1957)? How might the popularity of neoliberal beliefs affect the resilience of people who experience discrimination? These are issues on which contemporary psychological research can shed light (e.g., Son Hing et al. 2011).
After considering the forms that prejudice can take, I begin by reviewing the changes in prejudice that have taken place during the neoliberal era. Second, drawing on literatures in psychology that associate prejudice with experiences of psychological threat, I explore how societal changes linked to neoliberal policies, practices, and narratives might have increased the incidence of prejudice. Finally, I review psychological research, including my own, that examines the relationship between attitudes that reflect prejudice and beliefs associated with neoliberalism.
RESPONSES TO STIGMATIZATION: The Moderating Roles of Primary and Secondary Appraisals1
- Leanne S. Son Hing
-
- Journal:
- Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race / Volume 9 / Issue 1 / Spring 2012
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 07 June 2012, pp. 149-168
-
- Article
- Export citation
-
The more that devalued group members experience stigmatization, the worse their physical and mental health, well-being, and performance will be. However, the effects of stigmatization are often mixed, weak, and conditional. We should expect such variability in how devalued group members respond to stigmatization because resilience in the face of challenges is possible, depending on how stressful stigmatization is for people. Using the transactional model of stress (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984) as an organizing framework, I provide evidence that people will have different reactions to stigmatization depending on primary appraisals—that is, how harmful and self-relevant they appraise it to be—and on secondary appraisals—that is, whether or not they believe that they have the resources to cope with it. My review of the literature suggests that a stronger ingroup identification, stronger identification with a negatively stereotyped domain, chronic beliefs about stigmatization, and beliefs about meritocracy create vulnerabilities to stigmatization because they lead people to appraise stigmatization as more harmful and self-relevant. Furthermore, psychological optimism, a sense of control, self-esteem, as well as high socioeconomic status, a stronger identification with one's ingroup, and positive evaluations of the ingroup create resilience to discrimination because they allow people to perceive themselves as having the resources needed to cope with stigmatization. In conclusion, people will respond to the same potential stressor in different ways, depending on how self-relevant and harmful they perceive it to be and whether or not they perceive themselves as having the resources to cope. Thus, attention should be directed to developing families, communities, institutions, and societies that can provide people with the resources that they need to be resilient.
15 - Exploring the Discrepancy Between Implicit and Explicit Prejudice: A Test of Aversive Racism Theory
-
- By Leanne S. Son Hing, Department of Psychology, University of Guelph, Ontario, Canada, Greg A. Chung-Yan, Department of Psychology, University of Guelph, Ontario, Canada, Robert Grunfeld, Department of Psychology, University of Guelph, Ontario, Canada, Lori K. Robichaud, Department of Psychology, University of Guelph, Ontario, Canada, Mark P. Zanna, Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo
- Edited by Joseph P. Forgas, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Kipling D. Williams, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Simon M. Laham, University of New South Wales, Sydney
-
- Book:
- Social Motivation
- Published online:
- 04 August 2010
- Print publication:
- 04 October 2004, pp 274-293
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
INTRODUCTION
Many have argued that over recent decades the nature of prejudice has become more subtle, less negative, and less hateful (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Katz & Hass, 1988; McConahay, 1986). It is therefore difficult to reconcile such reports of lessened prejudice with the racial discrimination found in laboratory and field studies, as well as labor statistics (Human Resources Development Canada, 2001; Landau, 1995; Rudman & Glick, 1999; Sackett & DuBois, 1991; Sinclair & Kunda, 1999). One possible reason for the inconsistency between lessened prejudice, on the one hand, and continuing discrimination, on the other hand, is that the apparent decline in prejudice is illusory. It is possible that as societal norms have become more egalitarian, people report less prejudiced attitudes due to internal or external motivations (Crandall, O'Brien, & Eshleman, 2002; Devine, Brodish, & Vance, this volume; Plant & Devine, 1998). A second possible reason for the apparent inconsistency is that discrimination is due to prejudices that people are unaware they hold. If individuals are not consciously aware of their racism, they will honestly report low-prejudiced attitudes. Yet, such unconscious prejudice may result in discriminatory behavior.
The theory of aversive racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986) deals specifically with individuals who are presumed to be consciously egalitarian yet unconsciously prejudiced.
12 - Policies to Redress Social Injustice: Is the Concern for Justice a Cause Both of Support and of Opposition?
- Edited by Michael Ross, University of Waterloo, Ontario, Dale T. Miller, Princeton University, New Jersey
-
- Book:
- The Justice Motive in Everyday Life
- Published online:
- 08 September 2009
- Print publication:
- 11 February 2002, pp 204-225
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
As documented by the research in the current volume, people are profoundly affected by social injustice. Fortunately, efforts to remedy many forms of social injustice have been undertaken by our legal and political institutions. Yet, despite many well-intentioned efforts to remedy injustice at the societal level, a paradox exists: Often the policies designed to redress injustice are themselves criticized as unfair and, in turn, are opposed. As a result, there is mounting polarization at the societal level in terms of support for, or opposition to, the policies designed to redress social injustice. There is also a rising divergence of opinion among researchers in the psychological literature, due to evidence demonstrating that there are both possible benefits (see Crosby & VanDeVeer, 2000) and burdens (e.g., Heilman, Block, & Lucus, 1992) associated with such policies. In the hope of closing the chasm, we believe that it is necessary to better understand the basis of this paradox. As society diversifies and people question what is or is not fair, research in this vein is especially relevant. In one line of research at the University of Waterloo, we have been investigating the basis of the paradox, following in the tradition of Mel Lerner, both theoretically and methodologically. Theoretically, our overarching approach derives from what is perhaps Lerner's central legacy: his firm conviction that people have a fundamental or core justice motive (Lerner, 1974; Lerner, 1977; Lerner, 1980; Lerner & Lerner, 1981; Lerner & Miller, 1978).